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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews some of the recent advances in our understanding of the determinants of firms’ choices between
trade and foreign direct investment (fdi) as means by which to serve their overseas markets.  Over the past two
decades, fdi has grown much more rapidly than trade flows. The great majority of these investment flows have been
between developed countries with similar factor endowments and have been concentrated in knowledge-intensive
industries.  We present a series of stylized facts regarding foreign direct investment.  Fdi is positively affected by
market size, trade barriers, firm-level scale economies and the emergence of large free-trade areas or regional
trading blocs but is negatively affected by plant-level scale economies and barriers to foreign ownership.   We then
review some of the most important theoretical investigations of the trade/fdi choice.  Three strands of theoretical
literature have emerged in recent years: a knowledge-based approach building upon recent advances in organization
theory, a strategic choice approach building upon recent advances in modern industrial organization and a general
equilibrium approach building upon recent advances in trade theory.  The paper illustrates some of the more
important theoretical issues by developing two simple models in the knowledge-based and strategic traditions. Both
are shown to generate predictions that are in close accord with the stylized facts. We conclude by identifying some
of the big issues, particularly in strategic trade policy, that remain unresolved.
Keywords: foreign direct investment; organization theory; international trade.
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1. Introduction
This paper reviews some of the recent advances in our understanding of the determinants of firms’ choices
between trade and foreign direct investment (fdi) as means by which to serve their overseas markets.  The policy
relevance of this topic cannot be overstated.  World production is increasingly dominated by international
oligopolies, with an increasing degree of market interpenetration.  These firms are making strategic decisions on
how to serve their target markets that have important implications for trade flows, home and host country
employment, knowledge transfer and technological improvement.  Their trade/fdi choices and consequent value-
creating activities are affected by domestic and international trade policies in ways that are not at all well accounted
for in “traditional” trade models that focus on competitive markets and the role of comparative advantage and factor
endowments as determinant of trade flows.
If a firm chooses foreign direct investment as a means by which to serve its overseas markets it is then
considered to become a multinational enterprise, defined as a firm that “acquires a substantial controlling interest in
a foreign firm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country.” (Markusen, 1995)  The important questions reviewed in
this paper are first, why does a firm choose to become a multinational rather than an exporting firm?  Secondly, why
does such a firm choose multinationality rather than some other form of direct operation in foreign markets such as a
joint venture operation or licensing?
2. Some Background and Empirical Regularities
There has been a particularly rapid expansion of foreign direct investment over the past two decades.
UNCTAD and OECD data indicate that fdi has grown some four times as fast as exports over this period. Moreover,
as the data in Table 1 indicate, the stock of fdi has also grown steadily as a proportion of GDP. Nor does there seem
to be any indication that this growth is slowing down.  For example, Mataloni (1997) indicates that the operations of
“nonbank U.S. multinationals grew more rapidly in 1995 than they had grown, on average, since 1982.”
Table 1 and Table 2 further indicate that the great majority of fdi flows have been between developed
countries, especially within the OECD.  The extremely rapid growth of fdi in the European Union is particularly
noteworthy and reflects some of the theoretical considerations that will be developed in subsequent sections of this
paper: for more details, see Motta and Norman (1996).  The completion of the Single Market in the European Union
had the effect of significantly reducing the intra-EU barriers to trade but also held the threat of increasing the extra-
EU tariff and non-tariff barriers: what has come to be referred to as the threat of “Fortress Europe”.  In addition, the                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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period from the mid-1980’s in Europe saw a more concerted anti-dumping stance with respect to the exports to
Europe of firms, particularly but not exclusively based in the Far East (Tharakan, 1991). These changes significantly
altered the relative attractiveness of exporting to the EU countries and fdi in the EU.
(Tables 1 and 2 near here)
Table 3 hints at further features of foreign direct investment.
1  It seems clear that there is a remarkable
similarity in the industrial mix of fdi outflows and fdi inflows.  In other words, not only have the past two decades
seen a remarkable growth in intra-industry trade, they have also seen a remarkable growth in intra-industry foreign
direct investment.  Apparently, the economic forces that lead a firm based in country X to set up direct operations in
country Y will also encourage a firm based in country Y to set up direct operations in country X.
(Table 3 near here)
There are some further empirical regularities that should be noted and that have guided theoretical
developments.  First, the great majority of foreign direct investment, at least in the United States and in Europe, has
been “horizontal”.  The foreign affiliates supply the great majority of their output to local markets rather than
exporting intermediate products back to the home-country assembly operations of the parent companies.
2   Even
given this, however, a growing proportion of international trade is intra-firm trade (UNCTAD, 1997).
Secondly, there appears to be little indication that differences in factor endowments between countries are
associated with flows of foreign direct investment (Brainard, 1993).
Thirdly, there are important differences across industries in the extent to which multinational companies
dominate production. The industry and firm characteristics that appear to be most closely related to multinationality
are:
• high levels of R&D relative to sales;
• a large proportion of professional and technical workers;
• new products or products that incorporate complex technologies;
• high levels of advertising.
Multinationals also tend to be firms with a high proportion of intangible assets (Morck and Yeung, 1991) but with
relatively weak plant-level economies of scale.
                                                       
1   See also Norman and Dunning (1984) for earlier and much more detailed analysis.
2   The possible exception to this is Japanese foreign direct investment in the Far East, where a rather greater
proportion of output is exported to parent companies in Japan.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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It is clear that these characteristics have much in common.  There is, in particular, the obvious implication
that knowledge-intensive firms are more likely to be multinational.  The natural reason for this, which we shall
investigate in more detail below, is that this type of firm will find it more difficult to exploit whatever competitive
advantages it might have either through exporting or by commissioning an independent firm to operate on its behalf.
Finally, there is strong evidence that tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade directly affect multinationality:
see, for example, Brainard (1997). In addition, there is growing evidence that the decision to adopt fdi is
significantly affected by the emergence of regional free-trade blocs in Europe, the Asia-Pacific Rim and North
America: see the evidence cited in Motta and Norman (1996).
3. Theoretical Approaches
3.1 The Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) Framework
The theoretical approach to multinationality that has the longest tradition derives from the seminal
dissertation work of Hymer (his 1960 dissertation published as Hymer, 1976).  This approach starts from the
principle that multinational enterprises operate at an inherent disadvantage with respect to national firms because of
the additional costs of doing business abroad.  These derive from communications and management problems that
arise in running an operation at a distance, consumer attitudes to “foreign” firms, language, culture and other
operational barriers, and the costs of being outside the normal business and government networks.  For the overseas
affiliate to be profitable in the face of these disadvantages, it must possess compensating advantages such as
superior technology or products, or firm-level economies of scale.
This general approach has been codified in the OLI framework developed by Dunning (see, especially 1977
and 1981).
3  The OLI framework suggests that foreign direct investment will arise when three conditions are
satisfied.  First, the firm must possess specific, ownership advantages not available to other firms.  These advantages
can be tangible, such as a superior technology, patents on particular products or processes, or domestic firm size that
generates transferable economies of scale and scope.  Or the advantages can be intangible, perhaps embodied in a
brand name, trademark or other indication of product quality, or deriving from the firm’s having favored access to
particular customers.
Secondly, the foreign market should offer some location advantages that make it more profitable to serve
the overseas market by local production rather than by exporting.  Obvious candidates are high tariff and non-tariff
                                                       
3   Reference should also be made to the work of Buckley and Casson (1976) and Rugman (1981, 1985 and 1986).                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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barriers to exports or stringent anti-dumping regulations that inhibit the firm’s ability to price its exports to reflect
local market conditions.  Market size is another important location advantage: large markets make it easier to offset
the set-up costs associated with establishing an overseas affiliate.
Thirdly, there should be an internalization advantage in that the firm believes that its ownership advantages
are best exploited internally rather than sold directly through spot markets or offered to other firms through some
contractual arrangement such as licensing, the establishment of a joint venture or management contracting.  This
advantage derives from the difficulties that arise in writing enforceable and controllable contracts with potential
overseas partners that generate an income that approximates the true worth of the advantage being marketed.
Licensing, for example, is less likely to be feasible when it is difficult
• to find potential licensees;
• to formulate legally binding and enforceable contracts between licensor and licensee;
• for the licensor to control the quality of the product offered by the licensee.
4
3.2 Game Theoretic Approaches
We shall return to the internalization aspects of the OLI framework in section 3.3.  For the moment, we
consider alternative approaches that either take the OLI framework as given or call some of its underlying
assumptions into question.  These come in two broad forms.  On the one hand there are partial equilibrium models
that focus on the strategic underpinnings of the export/fdi choice.  Secondly, there are general equilibrium models
that have some game theoretic elements but focus more on the endogenous determinants of market structure than on
the strategic interplay between firms.  Both approaches depart to at least some extent from one important assumption
in the OLI framework – that the investing firm must have an ownership advantage to offset the cost disadvantages of
being a “foreign” firm.  This should not be surprising.  After all, if the firms in our economy act as Cournot
competitors or as Bertrand competitors producing differentiated products, there is no reason to believe that a firm
with an operating cost disadvantage in a particular market will automatically be excluded from serving that market.
The general equilibrium approach is very well documented in Markusen (1995) and so needs little further
mention here.  The main conclusions to be drawn from this work accord very well with the empirical regularities
noted above:
                                                       
4   Casson (1982) provides an extensive discussion of these issues.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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“(W)e should find multinationals concentrated in industries that fit at least one of three conditions:
firm-level activities or intangible assets are important; plant scale economies are not particularly
important; and tariffs and transport costs are high but barriers to direct investment are relatively
low.” (p. 177)
Moreover there is also a convergence hypothesis (Markusen and Venables, 1995):
“(M)ultinationals displace national firms and trade as countries become more similar in size,
technology and relative factor endowments.” (p. 180)
Markusen’s review deliberately focuses upon the work of trade theorists and so neglects some important
work that comes from the industrial organization perspective (to which Markusen himself has made significant
contributions).  We give a brief indication of how this approach works by considering a relatively simple model with
one new twist: that the competing firms produce differentiated products.
5  Assume that there are two identical
countries A and B.  In each country demand for a differentiated product is supplied by a pair of duopolists, firms 1
and 2.  Let pi be the price charged by firm i and qi be the output of firm i (i = 1, 2).  Then aggregate demand for each
firm’s product in each country is given by the linear inverse demand system:
6
(1) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 1
,
,
sq q s b a q q p
sq q s b a q q p
- - - =
- - - =
In equation (1), a is the consumer reservation price, b is an inverse measure of market size (the larger is b the
smaller is market size) and s is an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation between the two firms.  If
s = 0 consumers consider the two products to be totally differentiated: the two firms are effectively monopolists. By
contrast, if s = b/2 consumers consider the products of the two firms to be identical.  Each firm has constant
marginal costs normalized to zero but has to incur a set-up cost of F if it decides to establish an affiliate outside its
domestic base.  If a firm based in one country wishes to export to consumers based in the other country it incurs
tariff, non-tariff and transport costs of t per unit exported.
The firms are involved in a two-stage game.  In stage one they decide on the mode of market serving –
export or fdi.  In stage two they compete in quantities if they are Cournot firms or prices if they are Bertrand firms.
                                                       
5   For other articles in this vein see, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Motta (1992), Motta and
Norman (1996), Rowthorn (1992), Smith (1987).
6   This demand function is a special case of that used in Norman (1983) and de Fraja and Norman (1993): see also
Singh and Vives (1984).                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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As usual, we look for the subgame perfect equilibrium to this game.  We confine ourselves in this paper to the
Bertrand case since that has been the most neglected in the literature: very similar results are obtained in the Cournot
case.
An important distinction that must be drawn in analyzing the trade/fdi choice in this kind of model is
whether the firms have their home bases in different countries or in the same country.  Assume first that firm 1 has
its home base in country A and firm 2 in country B and that firm 1 is considering whether or not to invest in country
B (exactly analogous considerations affect firm 2’s decision whether to invest in country A). Table 4 describes the
pay-offs to firm 1 that will determine the equilibrium location configuration.
(Table 4 near here)
Denote the difference in profits from fdi as compared to exporting as  ( ) F s t b a , , , , p D .  It is tedious but easy
to confirm that Dp(.) is an increasing function of a and t and a decreasing function of b and F.   This accords with
the empirical regularities noted in the introduction. Fdi is more likely when trade barriers (captured by the parameter
t) are high and set-up costs (F) are low. Fdi is also favored by high values of a, which is the consumer reservation
price.  This parameter is more likely to be high for knowledge- and technology-intensive goods.  Finally, the
parameter b, which, recall, is an inverse measure of market size, again has the expected effect.
The impact of the product differentiation parameter s is, however, not as clear-cut. To see this, we
introduce some further normalization to the model.
7 Let a = a/t, s = s/b and f = b.F/t
2. With Bertrand competition
we have that fdi will be preferred to exporting if
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s a p D = s e - a s e s m = s e - a s m - a s m < f , 2
2 2 B
where:





s - s -
= s m  and  ( ) ( )
( )( ) s - s -






Equation (2) defines a relationship between the normalized set-up costs f and the normalized inverse
measure of product differentiation s.
It is easy to confirm that  ( ) 0 ,
0
> a s p D
= s s
B ,  ( )
( )
0 , < a s p D
a s = s s )
B  and both  ( ) a s p D ,
B  and  ( ) a s p D s ,
B  are
continuous for s in the interval [0,  ( ) a s ˆ ], where  ( ) a s ˆ  is the maximum value of s for which exporting is feasible.  It                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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follows that  ( ) a s p D ,
B  has at least one turning point in this interval, implying that there is likely to be at least one
double-switch in the export/fdi choice.  Extensive numerical grid search suggests that this turning point is, in fact,
unique and we denote it  ( ) a s . Further analysis also confirms that  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a s p D > a p D , ˆ , 0
B B .  As a result, we have
the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1:
Assume that product specification is symmetric and that the two Bertrand firms have home bases in different
countries.  The mode by which a firm will choose to serve its overseas market is determined as follows:
i)  for  ( ) ( ) a a s p D < f , ˆ B  firm i will choose foreign direct investment;
ii) for  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4 1 2 , 0 , ˆ - a = a p D < f < a a s p D
B B  there is a critical value  ( ) a s
u  such that firm i will
choose to export if s >  ( ) a s
u  and will choose foreign direct investment if s <  ( ) a s
u .
iii) for  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a s p D < f < a p D , , 0
B B  there are critical values  ( ) a s
l  and  ( ) a s
h  such that firm i
will choose to export if s <  ( ) a s
l  or if s >  ( ) a s
h  and will choose foreign direct investment if
( ) a s
l  < s <  ( ) a s
h .
iv) for  ( ) ( ) f < a a s p D ,
B  firm i will choose to export.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical curve f =  ( ) a s p D ,
B  and shows how this curve is affected by a.  Numerical
analysis confirms that  s
u, s
h and s  are increasing and s
l  is a decreasing function of a.  In other words, the range
of values of s for which fdi is the preferred mode is an increasing function of the transport-cost adjusted consumer
reservation price.
(Figure 1 near here)
There is a relatively simple intuition underlying parts i) and ii) of proposition 1. Since prices are strategic
complements, the choice of foreign direct investment by firm 1 reduces its operating cost disadvantage but makes it
a tougher competitor in the overseas market, leading to a reduction in the equilibrium prices charged by the two
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firms.
8  After all, firm 1 as an exporter is able to pass on more than 50 per cent of its export costs to consumers in
the overseas market.  So for fdi to be preferred the operating cost advantages of local production must more than
offset its fixed cost penalty and the increased intensity of price competition to which it gives rise.
It is not surprising, therefore, that if f is “low”, in our model less than  ( ) ( ) a a s p D , ˆ B , which implies that
set-up costs of fdi are low, market size is large or trade barriers are high, fdi will dominate the trade/fdi choice at any
degree of product differentiation.  Similar considerations arise for “intermediate” values of f, between
( ) ( ) a a s p D , ˆ B  and  ( ) a p D , 0
B . Admittedly, fdi will lead to tougher price competition but provided that the degree of
product differentiation is sufficiently great (s < s
u(a)) this will not offset the operating costs advantages of being a
local producer.  The desire to soften price competition, and so the commitment to exporting rather than fdi, applies
only when the competing products are “very alike” since this is when the rewards from softer price competition are
likely to be greatest.
Thus far, our results largely accord with intuition, as does part iv) of proposition 1.  The counterintuitive
result is iii).  For “high” values of f, between  ( ) a p D , 0
B  and  ( ) ( ) a a s p D ,
B  such as f1 in Figure 1, we have a
double switch in the trade/fdi choice by firm 1.  Exporting is preferred to fdi at low and high degrees of product
differentiation.  The intuition underlying the low differentiation case has already been outlined.  Now consider the
situation when the products are highly differentiated.  We know that for iii) to apply f must be sufficiently high that
if the two firms were monopolists (s = 0) firm 1 would prefer to export.  A decrease in the degree of product
differentiation decreases profits from both exporting and fdi. However, it has a sharper impact on export profits as a
consequence of the operating cost disadvantage of the exporting firm – at such high degrees of product
differentiation, the “toughening” effect of fdi on price competition is relatively weak.  For s > s
l(a) the operating
cost advantage of fdi is sufficiently strong to offset the set-up cost disadvantage of fdi.
What our analysis indicates, in other words, is that the relationship between the degree of product
differentiation and the trade/fdi choice is far from straightforward. In industries characterized by relatively low set-
up costs, where we are now measuring set-up costs adjusted for market size and trade barriers, we are more likely to
see fdi if the degree of product differentiation between firms is low.  By contrast, where set-up costs are relatively
                                                       
8   This is reminiscent of the “fat cat …” discussion of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and uses the classification from
Bulow et al. (1985).                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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high, exporting is likely to dominate in industries characterized by the highest as well as the lowest degrees of
product differentiation.
Now assume that both firms have home bases in country A and that they are considering whether or not to
invest in country B.
9  The pay-offs to the two firms are given in Table 5 using the same normalization as above.  As
before, a high consumer reservation price, high trade barriers, large market size and low set-up costs favor fdi, but
the effect of the degree of product differentiation is ambiguous.
(Table 5 near here)
Define  ( ) ( )





. We then have the following as a description of the subgame perfect
equilibrium for the two firms’ location choices.
PROPOSITION 2:
Assume that product specification is exogenous and symmetric and that the two firms have home bases in
the same country.  The mode by which the firms will choose to serve their overseas market is determined as
follows:
(i) for  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 - a - s d + a s m > f  both firms will export;
(ii) for  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 1 a - s e - a s m > f > - a - s d + a s m  one firm will export and the other
will use fdi;
(iii) for  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) f > a - s e - a s m
2 2  both firms will use fdi.
This proposition is illustrated in figure 2. For parameter combinations above AB both firms export,
between AB and AC one firm exports and the other uses fdi, while for parameter combinations below AC both firms
use fdi. (We shall discuss AD below.)  As can be seen, an increase in set-up costs f has the expected effect,
increasing the likelihood that firms will serve their external markets by exporting to them. Furthermore, since e(s) -
d(s) = 1, the location equilibrium (Export, Export) is a Nash equilibrium only if  ( ) ( ) 4 1 2 , 0 - a = a p D > f .  For any
lower value of f we have the result we have already discussed that fdi is more likely to be adopted when the degree                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
11
of product differentiation is low.  This is just a repeat of part ii) of proposition 1. In addition, the curve AC defining
the boundary between the equilibria (Export, FDI) and (FDI, FDI) is just that discussed above and so needs no
further explanation.
(Figure 2 near here)
The curve AB defining the boundary between (Export, FDI) and (Export, Export) is upward sloping,
indicating once again that when the set-up costs of fdi are relatively high, firms are more likely to choose fdi at low
degrees of product differentiation.  When the firms have home bases in the same country, the decision by one of
them to switch to fdi from exporting will lead to tougher competition in the export market but will also give the
investing firm an operating cost advantage.  This cost advantage of fdi is more likely to outweigh the tougher price
competition it generates when the degree of product differentiation is low.
In other words, once again we find that there is no simple relationship between the degree of product
differentiation and the decision by firms to adopt fdi as a means of supplying their overseas markets.   In industries
where set-up costs are relatively low, fdi can be expected to be associated with low degrees of product
differentiation between firms.  However, where set-up costs are relatively high, the reverse may well be true.
There is a final issue raised by the pay-off matrix of Table 5 that takes us back to the work of
Knickerbocker (1973).  Are there prisoners’ dilemma aspects to the equilibrium (FDI, FDI).  Would both firms be
better off continuing to export?  Again we focus on the Bertrand case while noting that a similar result holds in the
Cournot case.  For there to be a prisoners’ dilemma two conditions must be satisfied.  It is necessary first, that (FDI,
FDI) is a Nash equilibrium and secondly, that the individual firm’s profit in this equilibrium, (m(s)a
2 - f)t
2/b, is less
than the profit when both firms export, (m(s)(a-1)
2)t
2/b.  The first condition holds for all parameter combinations
below AC and the second holds for f > m(s)(a
2 - (a-1)
2), which is true for parameter combinations above AD.  In
other words, all parameter combinations in the region (F, F)PD bounded by AC and AD in Figure 2 give rise to this
type of prisoners’ dilemma.  Fdi by one firm may well be induced by the expectation that its rival will also adopt fdi,
even though both firms’ profits will be reduced.  The alternative of continuing to export when the rival invests leads
to an even greater reduction in profit.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
9   This case would also arise if the firms had home bases in countries A and B and were considering whether or not
to invest in a third country C.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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3.3 Internalization Revisited
An important issue that is unconsidered in the game theoretic models is why a firm will choose to invest
rather than, for example, entering into licensing or franchising agreements with local companies in the target
countries.  This issue does arise in the OLI framework as we have already noted.  The decision to internalize an
ownership-specific advantage is also a decision not to market that advantage to other firms.  Important reasons
causing the firm to choose internalization that have concerned many investigators are the public good nature of
knowledge-based ownership advantages and the informational asymmetry inherent in them.  If the firm has superior
knowledge, for example about the performance characteristics of its product or the technology embodied in the
product, it will be reluctant to reveal the information truthfully to a potential licensee since no effective contract can
be written to protect the firm from post-contractual opportunism on the part of the licensee. By an analogous
argument, if a potential licensee has superior information about local market conditions he will be reluctant to reveal
this truthfully to the firm, in this case because incomplete contracts will not protect the licensee from post-
contractual opportunism of the firm.
In addition, just as knowledge can easily be transferred internationally by licensing agreements, particularly
between countries at similar levels of development, so it is likely that this knowledge can be quickly learned and
potentially extended by those to whom it is licensed.  The fear of defection by the licensee – for example, by starting
up a new enterprise in competition with the licensing firm – may well make the potential licensor favor
internalization to licensing, particularly since it is very difficult to write enforceable contracts to prevent such
defection.  Analogous problems arise when the firm’s ownership advantage derives primarily from intangible assets
such as reputation.  The ability of the firm to extract rents from potential licensees is limited by the incentive that
licensees have to skimp on quality, damaging the firm in all of its markets.
It should not be thought, however, that the risks of moral hazard that underlie these problems are confined
to a firm’s external relations with potential licensees.  We know from the work of, for example, Hart and Moore
(1990), Hart (1995) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) that precisely the same moral hazard problems arise within the
various divisions of a firm.  This is even more likely to be the case when the divisions operate in different countries
with different cultures and at considerable distances from the headquarters operation.  What this implies, in other
words, is that fdi should be preferred when the moral hazard associated with using external markets is greater than
that associated with using internal markets.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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We develop a stylized model to illustrate this point.
10  Assume that a firm E is considering whether to
supply an overseas market through a licensing agreement with a domestic firm L or by establishing a subsidiary with
a local manager M. If the licensing agreement is signed it confers residual control rights to L in return for an agreed
license fee of P0. With a local subsidiary, M can expect to receive a profit share and has a base salary P0. (The
implicit assumption is that location considerations rule out exporting.)  E must enter into a long-term contract with
either L or M in order to encourage the necessary relationship-specific investment by L or M.  This contract provides
for a good to be produced at an agreed quality.  E knows that the good can be sold for a price B0 and that it can be
produced at cost C0.  If L provides the good the licensing agreement defines L’s profit share, while if M provides the
good his contract is an incentive-based profit-sharing contract.
Either L or M can use their local knowledge to modify the good but the actions they take to do so are
sufficiently complex to be uncontractible ex ante.  Rather, E indicates that he will be willing to renegotiate the
contract once these actions are observable.  There are two types of modification:
• a cost reducing innovation: L or M can apply effort e to secure a cost reduction c(e).  This cost reduction is,
however, also associated with a quality reduction that reduces the value of the good to consumers by d(e) in the
local market and, through its reputational effect, by d*(e) in E’s home market.
• a quality improving innovation: L or M can apply effort i to improve the quality of the basic good.  The
improvement is valued by consumers at q(i) in the local market and the reputational spillover to E’s home
market is q*(i).
Standard assumptions are made regarding the concavity of c, d, d*, q and q*. The quality effects of the two
types of innovation are important in that they reflect the moral hazard implicit in both licensing and foreign direct
investment.
Contractual incompleteness is such that modification of the basic good will not lead to a breach of contract.
Moreover, while e and i and their effects are observable by E, L and M they cannot be confirmed by outside agencies
and so cannot be made the subjects of enforceable contracts.  Any cost or quality innovation can be made solely with
the agreement of the individual with residual control rights.  Thus M must have E’s permission for any innovation
whereas L does not need such permission.  We assume that M does have some power, however, in that E cannot
fully implement M’s ideas should M be replaced.  Specifically, we assume that E is able to implement only a
                                                       
10   This model owes a considerable intellectual debt to Hart et al. (1997).                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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fraction 0 < 1 – h < 1 of the net gains - (d(e) + d*(e)) + c(e) + q(i) + q*(i) from M’s innovative ideas by replacing M
with another manager hired at cost.  The remainder is embodied in M’s human capital.  The parameter h embodies
the incentive that M has to introduce cost and quality innovations.
11 In particular, if h = 0 so that M’s ideas are fully
appropriable by E then no innovation will take place, while if h = 1 then M is essential to the effective operation of
the affiliate.
The resulting sequence of events is summarized in Figure 3.  As this figure indicates, the individuals
involved will want to renegotiate the contract at date 1 once the potential cost and quality innovations have been
identified and articulated.  We assume that the gains from renegotiation are distributed 50:50 between the relevant
parties: the Nash bargaining solution.  Any such renegotiation must, of course, reflect the residual control rights of
the activity and so will be affected by the default pay-offs of E, L and M.  The default pay-offs are determined as
follows.
(Figure 3 near here)
(A) With a licensing agreement and without renegotiation, L has the incentive to make both cost and quality
innovations since L has the residual control rights.  E’s default pay-off is P0 - d*(e) + q*(i) and L’s default pay-
off is B0 – P0 - C0 + c(e) - d(e) + q(i) - e - i.
(B) With the establishment of a local subsidiary and without renegotiation, E will replace M.  Both innovations are
implemented but E achieves only the share 1 – h of these.  E’s default pay-off is B0 – P0 – C0 + (1 – h)(- (d(e) +
d*(e)) + c(e) + q(i) + q*(i)) and M’s default pay-off is P0 – e – i.
We begin by identifying the value-maximizing equilibrium if e and i were to be contractible.  In such a case
the parties involved would choose e and i to solve:
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] i e i q i q e c e d e d
i e
- - + + + - - * * max
,
.
Given our concavity assumptions this has a unique solution (e*, i*) defined by the first-order conditions equating
marginal social cost of an innovation with its marginal social benefit:
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 * * * * = ¢ + ¢ - ¢ - e c e d e d ,
(5)  ( ) ( ) . 1 * * * = ¢ + ¢ i q i q
                                                       
11   See Milgrom and Roberts (1992) for an excellent discussion of incentive-based compensation schemes in such
principal-agent situations.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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Now consider the actual equilibrium that will be achieved after renegotiation with the alternative ownership
structures.
1. Licensing:
With a licensing agreement, renegotiation will relate to additional payments from E to L to internalize the
spillover q*(i).  The resulting gains will be split 50:50 between E and L.  The pay-offs are now:
(6)  ( ) ( ) , 2 * * 0 i q e d P U E + - =
(7)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 2 * 0 0 0 i e i q i q e d e c C P B U L - - + + - + - - =
Since L can correctly anticipate that renegotiation will take place, he will choose e and i to maximize UL.  This gives
the first-order conditions:
(8)  ( ) ( ) 1 = ¢ + ¢ - L L e c e d ,
(9)  ( ) ( ) . 1 2 * = ¢ + ¢ L L i q i q
There are two distortions from first-best reflecting the fact that L receives only partial payment for
internalizing the spillover effects of his innovations.  First, L underestimates the detrimental impact of cost reducing
innovations on product quality.  Secondly, he underestimates the beneficial impact of quality enhancing innovations.
2. Direct Ownership
If E sets up a local affiliate then renegotiation takes place with M over the profit generated by the fraction h
of M’s innovative ideas that E cannot expropriate.  These have value h(- (d(e) + d*(e)) + c(e) + q(i) + q*(i) – C0) and
will be shared equally so that the pay-offs to E and L will be:
(10)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ], * * 2 1 0 0 0 C i q i q e c e d e d h P B U E - + + + - - - + - =
(11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] . 2 * * 0 0 i e h C i q i q e c e d e d P U M - - - + + + - - + =
In this case M chooses e and i to maximize UM.  This gives the first-order conditions:
(12)  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 2 * = ¢ + ¢ - ¢ - h e c e d e d M M M ,
(13)  ( ) ( ) [ ] . 1 2 * = ¢ + ¢ h i q i q M M
The manager M does take account of the impact that his innovations have on the profits of E because of the
profit-based incentive scheme.  However, this incentive is weaker than it should be because the threat of
replacement means that the manager is unable to reap the full benefits of his quality innovation ideas and is not fully
compensated for scaling down his cost reducing innovations.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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3. Ownership Structure
The first-order conditions (5), (6), (9), (10) and (13), (14) are illustrated in Figure 4 and confirm that there
are moral hazard problems that give rise to distortions with both ownership structures, the element that we have
indicated is missing from much of the discussion of internalization.  Specifically, licensing leads to an equilibrium in
which eL > e* and iL < i*.  In other words, the licensee is induced to make excessive cost reducing and insufficient
quality enhancing innovative effort.  If E chooses to establish an overseas affiliate instead, the spillover effects of
M’s ideas are taken partially into account.  However, the weakness of the incentives offered to the local manager M
leads to an inefficiently low level of both cost and quality innovations: eM < e* and iM < i*.  Moreover, because E
offers M weaker incentives for quality improving innovations than he offers to L, we also find that iM < iL.
(Figure 4 near here)
There is an immediate implication from these results that accords well with the theoretical discussion of the
advantages of internalization versus the use of external markets to exploit an ownership advantage.
PROPOSITION 3:
Costs C0 – c(e) will always be lower with licensing than with direct ownership but local quality B0 – d(e) +
q(i) and  total quality B0 – d(e) – d*(e) + q(i) + q*(i) may be higher or lower.
It is reasonable to suggest that E will choose the ownership structure that maximizes total surplus UE + UL
or UE + UM since this gives the greatest scope for mutually beneficial exchange between E and either L or M.  In
doing so, E must balance the two sets of distortions we have identified.  Licensing gives rise to an excessive
incentive to pursue cost and quality reducing innovations while giving too little weight to quality improving
innovations.  Internalization and direct ownership, by contrast, gives too weak an incentive to pursue cost and
quality reducing innovations while giving even less weight than licensing to quality improving innovations.  The
following propositions shed light on the forces that determine the relative ranking of licensing and direct ownership.
PROPOSITION 4:
(1) Let the negative spillover d*(e) be replaced by q*d*(e).  Then licensing will be preferred to direct
ownership for q* sufficiently small.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
17
(2) Let the negative spillovers d(e) and d*(e) be replaced by qd(e) and q*d*(e), and let the cost
reduction c(e) be replaced by rc(e).  Then licensing will be preferred to direct ownership for q, q*
and r sufficiently small.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple enough and accords well with the literature on
internalization.  Part (1) is a direct consequence of the fact that a very low value of the parameter q* is equivalent to
the negative spillover effect on product quality from cost reducing innovations being very small.  Licensing then
generates cost reducing innovations that are “nearly” socially efficient while also having a level of quality
improving innovation that is nearer to first-best than does direct ownership.  In other words, licensing is preferred
when its socially damaging effects on product quality are weak since then the stronger incentives to reduce costs and
improve product quality that characterize licensing are socially beneficial.
Part (2) follows since, very low values of the parameters q, q* and r imply that the equilibrium values of
cost reducing innovative effort eL, eM and e* are all near zero.  As a result, the choice of quality improving
innovation i determines the value-maximizing ownership structure, with the effect that licensing is preferred.  In this
case the opportunities for cost and quality reducing innovation are limited.  It follows that the cost reducing efforts
of the licensee will not be particularly damaging whereas his stronger incentive to undertake quality improving
innovations is desirable.
Under what circumstances will internalization and direct ownership be preferable?
PROPOSITION 5:
(1) Let the cost reducing innovation be given by c(e) = d(e) + d*(e) + sb(e) and let the local impact
on quality q(i) be given by tq(i).  Then for s, t sufficiently small and h sufficiently close to 1,
direct ownership will be preferred to licensing.
(2)  Let the cost reducing innovation be given by c(e) = d(e) + d*(e) + sb(e) and let the impact on
quality q(i), q*(i) be given by tq(i) and t*q*(i).  Then for s, t, t* sufficiently small, direct
ownership will be preferred to licensing.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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When the parameter s is close to zero the conditions of part (1) are such that the gains from cost saving
innovation are fully offset by the quality reduction.  As a result, the weak incentives for cost reduction with direct
ownership are efficient.  By contrast, the incentive to make cost reductions with licensing remains inefficiently
strong since the licensee ignores the negative quality spillover.  With t near to zero and h near to 1, the incentives
that the licensee and the manager have to make quality improving innovations are roughly identical, so that direct
ownership is preferred to licensing.
The conditions of part (2) imply that the equilibrium values of quality improving innovative effort iL, iM and
i* are all approximately zero, meaning that it is the choice of cost reducing innovative effort e that will determine
social efficiency.  By the same argument as for part (1), when s is small direct ownership is preferable since
licensee ignores the negative spillover of his cost reducing efforts.
This proposition also has an appealing intuition.  Direct ownership through internalization is likely to be
preferred when cost reduction has a strong quality reducing effect since the incentive of the local manager to make
such damaging cost reductions is weaker than for the licensee.  However, this is not sufficient of itself.  It must also
be the case that the quality improving efforts by the licensee (and the local manager) are relatively weak. This is
more likely to be the case when there are few opportunities for quality improving innovations by either the licensee
or the manager and, perhaps, when the manager has strong incentives to innovate (h near 1).  These conditions are
likely to be satisfied when the ownership advantages enjoyed by E are knowledge-based and where reputational
effects are strong.  They are precisely the situations that have been identified in the literature as favoring
internalization over external marketing of ownership advantages.
4. Future Research
Considerable progress has been made in our understanding of the motives for and determinants of foreign
direct investment since the seminal work of Hymer.  We now have a relatively solid theoretical foundation drawing
on the foundations of both trade theory and advances in modern industrial organization.  Moreover, as we hope to
have shown in the last section, recent advances in organization theory have added considerably to our understanding
of why firms choose to internalize particular competitive advantages rather than exploit them through external
markets.  Each of these theoretical strands produces results that seem to sit well with the stylized facts.
However, this is by no means the end of the road in this important area of economic analysis.  Direct
empirical testing of the various propositions has made considerable advances but still relies, perhaps excessively, on                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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proxy variables.  There is a need to build more on, for example, the early case study and survey work of Dunning to
understand more fully the motivations behind foreign direct investment, the relationship between parent and
affiliate, and the reasons companies have for rejecting alternative approaches such as licensing.
While we have concentrated in this paper on horizontal fdi, there is no question that vertical fdi is growing
apace.  The motives for vertical integration can be reasonably well articulated using recent advances on the early
work of Coase but we need to investigate whether the ability to operate across national boundaries strengthens a
firm’s desire to own and operate separate stages of production.
There are also important policy issues that need to be investigated.  We have seen that the choice between
exporting and foreign direct investment is affected in important ways by trade policy. However, it should also be
recognized that the growing importance of major global companies that are internationally footloose will affect trade
policy.  For example, it is easy to cite cases in which international companies have “captured” the framers of trade
policy by inducing them to get involved in bidding wars to attract particular investments. This has important
implications for strategic trade policy that remain largely undeveloped.
Finally, much more needs to be said regarding the welfare effects of fdi.  There is some recent evidence
suggesting that fdi “can act as an important channel for the diffusion of new ideas and new innovations even
between developed countries.  Such investments can enhance the growth process in the host economy and raise
welfare in the home economy by providing an additional flow of income to an investment in knowledge.” (Barrell
and Pain 1997, p. 1785)  The evidence on the employment effects of fdi and of the impact of fdi on investment by
indigenous firms is, however, less clear-cut but is an essential element in the discussion of trade policy in a world
increasingly dominated by multinational enterprises.                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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Figure 1: The Export/FDI Choice – firms located
in different countries
Figure 2: The Export/FDI Choice – firms located
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Table 1: Global Foreign Direct Investment Stocks
1980 1985 1990 1995
Outward FDI
    World
        $ billion 513.7 685.5 1684.1 2730.1
        GDP (% of) 4.9 5.9 8.1 9.7
    OECD
        $ billion 501.9 657.4 1606.2 2503.2
        GDP (% of) 6.8 6.1 10.6 13.2
        Share of Total (%) [97.7] [95.9] [95.4] [91.7]
    EU-15
        $ billion 213.2 286.5 777.2 1208.8
        GDP (% of) 7.4 7.1 13.8 17.4
        Share of Total (%) [41.5] [41.8] [46.1] [44.3]
Inward FDI
    World
        $ billion 481.9 734.9 1716.9 2657.9
        GDP (% of) 4.6 6.3 8.3 9.4
   OECD
        $ billion 356.4 526.3 1361.4 1922.0
        GDP (% of) 4.8 4.9 9.0 10.1
        Share of Total (%) [74.0] [71.6] [79.3] [72.3]
    EU-15
        $ billion 185.0 226.5 712.2 1028.1
        GDP (% of) 6.4 5.6 12.7 14.8
        Share of Total (%) [38.4] [30.8] [41.5] [38.7]
Source: Barrell and Pain (1997)
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment and Export Flows by Source and
Recipient Countries 1987-1991 as Shares of Totals
Investment Exports
Developed to other Developed 80% 61%
Developed to less Developed 17% 15%
Less developed to Developed 2% 15%
Less developed to Less Developed 1% 8%
Source: Markusen and Venables (1995)                                                                                                                                            Foreign Direct Investment
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Table 3: Total Assets and Gross Product of US Affiliates Overseas and Overseas Affiliates in the US, 1995
(millions of dollars)











Petroleum 203,386 104,358 100,363 30,525
Manufacturing 633,696 587,049 232,764 156,991
   Food and kindred products 72,228 57,195 25,159 12,229
   Chemicals and allied products 151,407 191,614 48,104 39,768
   Primary and fabricated metals 27,369 55,979 9,187 17,804
   Industrial machinery and equipment 102,583 43,391 34,444 13,693
   Electronic and other electric equipment 64,353 52,739 24,969 18,470
   Transportation equipment 91,909 34,125 36,905 9,478
   Other manufacturing 123,847 152,007 53,997 45,550
Wholesale trade 200,163 222,616 55,785 39,135
Finance, insurance and real estate
(a) 1,177,183 1,179,669 14,826 17,041
Services 95,341 110,674 33,695 23,753
Other industries 103,464 131,264 25,527 35,561
Notes: (a) Excluding depository institutions.
Source: Survey of Current Business, June and October, 1997.
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